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The specialisation paradigmAbstract 
 
This paper brings together several strands of the literature on the endogenous effects 
of monetary integration: i.e., whether sharing a single currency may set in motion forces 
bringing countries closer together. The start of EMU has spurred a new interest in this debate. 
Four areas are analysed: the endogeneity of economic integration, in which we look primarily 
at evidence on prices and trade; the endogeneity of financial integration or equivalently of 
insurance schemes based on capital markets; the endogeneity of symmetry of shocks; and the 
endogeneity of product and labour market flexibility. We present diverse arguments and, 
where possible, explore the incipient empirical literature focussing on the euro area. Our 
preliminary conclusion is one of moderate optimism. The different endogeneities that exist in 
the dynamics towards optimum currency areas are at work. How strong these endogeneities 
are and how quickly they will do their work remains to be seen.  
  
 
JEL classification: E42, F13, F33 and F42 
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April 2005  Non-technical summary 
 
This paper brings together several strands of the literature on the endogenous effects 
of monetary integration: i.e., whether sharing a single currency – in this paper we look at 
the euro -- may set in motion forces bringing countries closer together. We imagine these 
forces as some virtuous processes increasing the integration of euro area countries over time.  
 
The merit for having kick-started this debate goes to Andrew Rose and Jeffrey 
Frankel.  By studying the effects of several currency unions that occurred in the past, they 
showed that monetary integration leads to very significant deepening of reciprocal trade. The 
implication for the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is that the euro area 
may, over time, turn into an optimum currency area (OCA) even if it wasn’t an OCA before 
(i.e., the “endogeneity of OCA” effect).  
 
Our aim is to explore more systematically the notion of endogeneity of OCA that 
could originate from several sources other than trade. Therefore, we address here the issue of 
“endogeneities of OCA.”  Such endogeneities are a set of interacting processes improving the 
OCA-ratings of a currency area.  We look at the empirical literature to find out how strong 
such endogeneities are in the following four areas:  
•  the endogeneity of economic integration, and  primarily at evidence on prices and 
trade;  
•  the endogeneity of financial integration or equivalently of insurance schemes 
provided by capital markets; 
•  the endogeneity of symmetry of shocks and (similarly) at synchronisation of outputs; 
and 
•  the endogeneity of product and labour market flexibility.  
 
Why should European monetary integration improve the OCA-rating of the euro 
area?  What drives the endogenous effect? Our working definition of “endogeneities of OCA” 
is that monetary integration represents, amongst others, a removal of “borders” (very broadly 
intended to include also national monies). This contributes to the narrowing of distances and a 
change in the incentive structure of agents. Engel and Rogers (2004) note that a currency 
union strengthens the effects of a free market by rendering the latter irrevocable.  Monetary 
integration also signals the willingness to commit to even broader economic integration, 
amongst others, on issues of property rights, non-tariff trade bariers, labour policy, 
regulations, and social policies. A common currency is also seen as “a much more serious and 
durable commitment” than other monetary arrangements (McCallum (1995)). It precludes 
future competitive devaluation, facilitates foreign direct investment and the building of long-
term relationships, and is likely to encourage forms of political integration. Producers may be 
more willing to undertake large fixed costs involved with exporting abroad. This will promote 
reciprocal trade, economic and financial integration and foster even business cycle 
synchronisation among the countries sharing a single currency. 
 
The subject of endogeneities of OCA is still rather new, and the start of EMU is quite 
recent.  What does this paper deliver?  We start by presenting a conceptual framework within 
which to discuss such sources of endogeneities of OCA and then analyse one area at the time. 
In all the four areas our conclusion is a measured one. Since much of the empirical work 
assembled thus far on the effects of the euro is preliminary, our conclusions are also. 
 
First, as far as the endogeneity of economic integration is concerned (where we 
looked primarily at trade and prices), we find that EMU has already had a significant effect on 
price changes in product markets: they have become more homogeneous across euro area 
countries.  It is unclear, however, how much of this convergence comes from EMU and how 
5
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April 2005much from the internal market program. Concerning trade, countless international studies 
suggests that the potential for more trade after monetary unification is large: a monetary union 
is a strong force towards additional trade creation among its members. Such gains would 
apply even to closely linked countries such as Canada and the US.   
 
The launch of the euro may have already contributed to raising reciprocal trade 
among euro area countries. However, these estimates are still very dispersed and limited (due 
to the few datapoints that are available). There are two important qualifications to keep in 
mind in order to set these findings into context. The first is that European countries exhibit 
already high degrees of reciprocal openness: trade among European countries has 
continuously risen over the last 50 years since the onset of European institutional integration 
that started in 1958.  Hence, it may be difficult to witness spectacular surges in intra-
European trade of several orders of magnitudes.  The second qualification is that, the trade 
creating effects of a monetary union may take a lot of time to be felt (a point also raised by 
Rose (2004)). Rose suggests a period of about 15-20 years.  
 
Second, the impact of the euro on financial markets is evident in some market 
segments such as money markets. In other segments, the introduction of the euro may be 
starting to contribute to greater depth and liquidity.  In bond and equity markets a gradual 
process of structural change and increasing integration is unfolding.  Evidence of significant 
risk-sharing is modest thus far, but encouraging. However, there are several areas in which 
financial market integration has not yet had significant effects.   
 
Third, our discussion leads to the expectation that we should await more symmetry in 
shocks for euro area countries. Although there is still a lot of uncertainty here on how 
clustering forces will display their effects vis-à-vis dispersion forces, and to what extent 
increased risk sharing (i.e., financial integration) will foster income insurance and 
specialisation, it is not unreasonable to observe that there is an endogeneity effect in the 
degree of symmetry of shocks in EMU. 
 
Fourth, although the theory is ambiguous, some empirical studies have come to the 
conclusion that labour market flexibility is likely to be enhanced in a monetary union. If this 
is confirmed by more studies, it leads to the conclusion that the start of a monetary union 
creates a potentially powerful endogeneity for these OCA-criteria.  
 
On the whole our conclusion is one of moderate optimism. The different 
endogeneities that exist in the dynamics towards optimal currency areas are at work. How 
strong these endogeneities are and how quickly they do their work remains to be seen.  Some 
non-economic factors may be playing a role as well.  In fact, some authors are asking whether 
it matters why a currency union is created in the first place. Would alternative motivations for 
the creation of a monetary union affect the endogeneities they may engender?  It remains also 
to be understood how such historical and cultural motivations may affect the linkages that 
have been discussed in the paper.  These questions will continue to provide rich sources of 





Working Paper Series No. 468
April 2005 
This paper brings together several strands of the literature on the endogenous effects 
of monetary integration. The start of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has 
spurred a new interest in this debate: i.e., whether sharing a new single currency, the euro, 
sets free forces that bring euro area countries closer together.   Much of the merit for having 
kick-started it goes to Andrew Rose and Jeffrey Frankel (see Rose (2000 and 2004) and 
Frankel and Rose (1997 and 2001)). 
 
By studying the effects of several currency unions that occurred in the past, Rose and 
Frankel showed that monetary integration leads to very significant deepening of reciprocal 
trade. The implication for EMU is that the euro area may turn into an optimum currency area 
(OCA) after the launch of monetary integration even if it wasn’t an OCA before, or 
“countries which join EMU, no matter what their motivation may be, may satisfy OCA 
properties ex-post even if they do not ex-ante!” (Frankel and Rose 1997). Consequently, the 
borders of new currency unions could be drawn larger in expectation that trade integration 
and income correlation will increase once a currency union is created.  This has been termed 
the “endogeneity of optimum currency area” effect.
1  
The endogeneity of OCA effect (of Frankel and Rose, et alii) is grounded on two 
main insights.  The first insight is that the degree of openness, i.e., reciprocal trade between 
the members of the currency area, is likely to increase. This insight is widely accepted 
although there are different views on its strength (as we shall discuss below).  The second 
insight postulates a positive link between trade integration and income correlation. On this 
insight there are instead diverging views (as we shall also discuss below). 
 
This paper revisits the arguments behind both insights and explores more 
systematically the notion of endogeneity of OCA that could originate from several other 
sources. Several authors have in fact brought forward concepts similar to the above 
hypothesis of “endogeneity of OCA” but in different areas than trade. Artis and Zhang (1999) 
and others have discussed the endogeneity of symmetry of shocks. Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000), Saint Paul and Bentolila (2002), and Saint-Paul (2002) discuss the endogeneity of 
labour market institutions.  Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, Yosha (2003) and other authors have 
discussed the effects of sharing a single currency on financial markets and insurance schemes.  
Therefore, we address here the issue of “endogeneities of OCA.”
2  These, endogeneities of 
OCA can be seen as a set of processes triggered by the start of a monetary union.  
 
Our working definition of “endogeneities of OCA” is that monetary integration 
represents, amongst others, a removal of “borders” (very broadly intended to include also 
national monies), that contributes to the narrowing of distances and a change in the incentive 
structure of agents. It also reveals the willingness to commit over time to even broader 
economic integration amongst others “on issues of property rights, non-tariff trade bariers, 
labour policy, etc” (Engel and Rogers (2004)). This might catalyse progress in several areas 
                                                 
1  However, an optimum currency area needs to be judged along more dimensions than just trade 
openness.  Optimality is also captured by the mobility of labour and other factors of production, price 
and wage flexibility, diversification in production and consumption, similarity in inflation rates, 
financial integration, fiscal integration, similarity of shocks, and political integration. Sharing of these 
OCA properties -- among countries forming an “area” -- reduces the usefulness of nominal exchange 
rate adjustments among them by: fostering internal and external balance; reducing the impact of some 
types of shocks; or facilitating the adjustment thereafter. See Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and 
Corden (1972). For recent surveys see Tavlas (1993), De Grauwe (2001) and Mongelli (2002). 
2 Several relevant aspects are not covered in this paper.  Artis and Zhang (1998) and Buti and Suardi 
(2000) argue that the European process of economic and monetary integration might have had a 
“disciplining effect.” Other authors have mentioned that political institutions might also be endogenous 
to some extent (Issing (2004)).  Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2005) compare “rigid” and “flexible” 
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Section 1.   Introduction by which we judge an optimum currency area such as: the mobility of labour and other factors 
of production, price and wage flexibility, diversification in production and consumption, 
similarity in inflation rates, financial integration, fiscal integration, and similarity of shocks.
3   
 
Hence, endogeneities of OCA are a set of interacting processes improving the OCA-
ratings of a currency area (i.e., a group of sovereign countries sharing a single currency). 
Against this background there are four areas that we analyse in this context:  
•  the endogeneity of economic integration, and  primarily at evidence on prices and trade;  
•  the endogeneity of financial integration or equivalently of insurance schemes provided by 
capital markets; 
•  the endogeneity of symmetry of shocks and (similarly) at synchronisation of outputs; and 
•  the endogeneity of product and labour market flexibility.  
 
Given that this subject is so new, and the start of EMU is so recent, what can we deliver?  
In Section 2 we present a conceptual framework to discuss endogeneities.  Section 3 discusses 
the endogeneity of economic integration. Section 4 discusses the endogeneity of symmetry of 
shocks. Section 5 discusses the endogeneity of insurance schemes. Section 6 discusses the 
endogeneity of labour market flexibility. These four areas are of course inter-linked and we 
try to highlight some of the main connections and interdependences.   Section 7 presents some 
preliminary concluding observations and open issues for further consideration.   
 
We should acknowledge here that several assessments of the impact of EMU, or 
specifically the euro, have already appeared (e.g., OECD (2000), Baldwin, Bertola and 
Seabright (2003), European Commission (2004), and others). They are all very useful and 
informative: but what distinguishes this paper from them is a systematic attempt to focus on 
the sources and foundation of the four endogeneities.    
 
 
Why should European monetary integration improve the OCA-rating of the euro 
area?  What drives any endogenous effect? How can we illustrate these phenomena?  
 
a.   Market-based forces fostering endogeneity  
 
There are diverse market-based forces at play.  Engel and Rogers (2004) note that a 
currency union strengthens the effects of a free market by rendering the latter irrevocable and 
by signalling a commitment toward even more harmonisation in areas of regulations and 
social policies.  A common currency among partner countries is seen as “a much more serious 
and durable commitment” than other monetary arrangements between countries (McCallum 
(1995)). It precludes future competitive devaluation, facilitates foreign direct investment and 
the building of long-term relationships, and is likely to encourage forms of political 
integration. Producers may be more willing to undertake large fixed costs involved with 
exporting abroad (see Box 2 below). This will promote reciprocal trade, economic and 
financial integration and foster even business cycle synchronisation among the countries 
sharing a single currency.  However, there are diverging views on this link (as we shall also 
discuss below).  
 
Some pecuniary costs disappear or fall following monetary integration. The 
introduction of the euro contributes, amongst others, to reducing trading costs both directly 
and indirectly: e.g., by removing exchange rate risks and the cost of currency hedging. Some 
                                                 
3 Padoan (2002) discusses EMU as an evolutionary process that is sustained by: the transformation of 
economic structures to support monetary integration, and the transformation of the policy regime 
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Section 2.   Some conceptual elements of endogeneities of OCA   information costs will be reduced. The euro is expected to have a catalyzing role for the 
Single Market Program by enhancing price transparency and discouraging price 
discrimination therefore removing money illusion. This should contribute to reducing market 
segmentation and fostering competition.  
 
Finally, one single money is more efficient than multiple currencies in performing the 
roles of medium of exchange and unit of account. As a result, a common currency promotes 
convergence in social conventions with potentially far reaching legal, contractual and 
accounting implications (Garcia-Herrero et al (2001)).   
 
b.  Institutional forces fostering endogeneity 
 
There are institutional forces at play, and EMU might have a catalysing role. The 
existence of EMU is likely to intensify  ongoing institutional reforms, as for example, those 
fostered and monitored by the EU Commission and including the Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP), the Lamfalussy Report and its follow ups, the Giovannini Report and others 
(see for example the EU Commission Scoreboard).   
 
c.   A graphical representation 
 
In this section we use a simple graphical device to illustrate changes in the OCA-
rating along three main dimensions: i.e., economic integration (including e.g., openness), 
income correlation within the currency area, and flexibility of each country participating to 
the currency area.  A deepening of different OCA properties generates improvements in the 
scores of these three dimensions as follows:  
 
  Economic integration and income correlation.  The degree of economic openness 
and the correlation of incomes are crucial in assessing the net benefits from currency union. 
Countries sharing a high level of either openness or income correlation among them will find 
it beneficial to share a single currency. This trade-off is illustrated by the downward sloping 
“OCA line” in Figure 1.  
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The OCA-line is the collection of combinations of symmetry and integration among 
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April 2005downward sloping for the following reason. A decline in symmetry (increase in asymmetry) 
raises the costs of a monetary union. These costs are mainly macroeconomic in nature. They 
arise because the loss of a national monetary policy instrument is more costly as the degree of 
asymmetry increases. Integration is a source of benefits of a monetary union, i.e. the greater 
the degree of integration the more the member countries benefit from the efficiency gains of a 
monetary union. Thus, the additional (macroeconomic) costs produced by less symmetry can 
be compensated by the additional (microeconomic) benefits produced by more integration. 
 
Points to the right of the OCA-line represent groupings of countries for which the 
benefits of a monetary union exceed its costs.  We have put the 50 US States and the euro 
area to the right of the OCA-line because we believe that the microeconomic benefits of these 
monetary unions more than compensate their macroeconomic costs.  To the left of the OCA 
line the benefits from monetary independence dominate the efficiency gains from the union.  
We have put the newly enlarged European Union (with 25 member states) to the left of the 
OCA-line because we believe that this group of countries is not yet sufficiently integrated to 
generate efficiency gains that will compensate for the macroeconomic costs of the union. We 
realize, however, that this is a controversial issue and that not all economists may agree.  
 
The degree of economic integration and income correlation evolve over time. There are 
different views on such evolution (as illustrated by the arrows around the EU and euro area 
circles in Figure 1). As is discussed in Section 3 below, most authors agree that openness is 
likely to increase among countries sharing a single currency. The intuition is the following: 
the introduction of the single currency will contribute to reducing trading costs both directly 
and indirectly, e.g., by removing exchange rate risks (and the cost of hedging) and 
diminishing information costs. The single currency will also spur transparency and 
competition, lessen segmentation, and reduce transportation and transaction costs.  
 
There is disagreement concerning the extent to which income correlation might rise, or 
fall. In one case the increased openness raises income correlation (and reduces asymmetry of 
shocks). The EU then moves along the upward arrow. In another case, that we call the 
specialisation case, we move along the downward sloping arrows in Figure 1. This then 
produces the opposite effect, and more flexibility for the monetary union would be required as 
is discussed next.  
 
Income correlation and flexibility.  In addition to the degree of economic openness and 
income correlation there is another important dimension to judge the merit of monetary 
integration, i.e., the degree of flexibility. The trade-off between symmetry and flexibility is 
illustrated by the downward sloping “OCA line” in Figure 2.   
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Points on the OCA-line define combinations of income correlation (symmetry) and 
flexibility for which the costs and the benefits of a monetary union just balance. It is 
negatively sloped because a declining degree of symmetry (which raises the costs) 
necessitates an increasing flexibility (which is a source of benefits of a monetary union) To 
the right of the OCA-line the degree of flexibility is large given the degree of symmetry, so 
that the benefits of the union exceed the costs. To the left of the OCA-line there is insufficient 
flexibility for any given level of symmetry. Note that the OCA-line is drawn for a given level 
of integration (I1)  
 
Again, the 50 US States and the current members of the euro area are located on the right 
of the OCA line.  Some authors doubt that the newly enlarged European Union (EU25) as a 
whole should yet share a single currency, and we illustrate this by placing the EU on the left 
of the OCA line.  How would further integration affect the movement towards the OCA line 
for the newly enlarged EU25? The OCA-line was drawn for a given level of integration (I1). 
Increasing integration has the effect of shifting the OCA-line downwards, i.e. when 
integration increases the benefits of the union increase so that we need less flexibility and/or 
less symmetry to make the monetary union beneficial. If there is endogeneity in integration 
then starting a monetary union among the EU will bring it closer to the OCA-zone. 
 
Box 1.  An illustration of the interaction between integration, flexibility and symmetry 
 
There is interaction between integration, flexibility and symmetry that we now illustrate in 
more detail. Let’s postulate that the net benefits of monetary union are a positive function of: 
o  the degree of flexibility (F) 
o  the degree of symmetry (S) 
o  the degree of integration (I) 
 
We can specify the relation between net benefits (B) and the three variables, F, S, and I as follows 
(assuming that these relationships are linear) 
 
B = αF  + βI + γS 
 
where  α,  β,  γ are positive parameters.  This allows us to derive the OCA-plane, i.e. the 
combinations of  F, I and S for which the net benefits of a monetary union are zero. Set B=0, then: 
 
  F = -β’I - γ’S 
 
where  β’= β/α  and  γ’= γ/α .  A graphical representation of this relation is given in figure 3. We 
have normalized the variables such that  
 
  0 < I < 1 and  -1 < S < 1;   
Thus, S can be positive and negative depending on whether shocks are symmetric or asymmetric. 
Figure 3 synthesises the three trade-offs between: flexibility and integration, symmetry and 
flexibility, and symmetry and integration.  
The figure also highlights the interaction between these tradeoffs. To illustrate this, let us 
concentrate on the trade-off between symmetry and flexibility, which shows that when symmetry 
declines more flexibility is needed to make OCA beneficial. It can be seen that this trade-off 
depends on integration. Start with zero integration and let it gradually increase. Then the 
relationship between symmetry and flexibility is shifted downwards, i.e. one needs less flexibility 
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There are more such interactions. Let us focus on the trade-off between integration and 
flexibility. This trade-off is influenced by the degree of symmetry. An increase in the latter leads 
to a downward shift of the trade-off between integration and flexibility.  Finally, there is a trade-
off between integration and symmetry. This trade-off is influenced by the degree of flexibility. 
When flexibility increases the trade-off between integration and symmetry shifts downwards so 
that one needs less of both integration of and symmetry to make a monetary union advantageous.   
These interactions are important for understanding endogeneities and their 
interdependence. Let us assume that the European Union 25 as a whole is located below the 
OCA-plane. A decision to form a monetary union then sets in motion different endogeneities. 
First, integration in terms of more trade between countries sharing a single currency is likely 
to increase. This has the effect of improving the symmetry-flexibility trade-off thereby 
facilitating the movement into the OCA-zone. A second endogeneity is symmetry. The 
decision to enter monetary union has the potential to increase symmetry. This in turn 
improves the trade-off between flexibility and integration, thereby facilitating the movement 
into the OCA-zone.   In this sense, endogeneities in integration, symmetry and flexibility 
reinforce each other, and speed up the process into the OCA-space.  In the next section we 
discuss the nature of these endogeneities in greater detail.  
 
Section 3.  Endogeneity of economic integration  
 
In what follows we start by discussing some research focussing on trade and then turn to 
evidence on prices. Financial integration is discussed in Section 6.  
 
a.  Borrowing gravity from physics and “border effects” 
  
There is an old literature from the sixties (see Tinbergen (1962), Poyhonen (1963) 
and Linnemann (1966), that looks at geographical distance as a determinant of international 
trade patterns. This literature draws on the gravity model from physics. Translated into 
economics: attraction is trade, mass is GDP, and distance is distance. An important difference 
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different languages and conventions, and legal systems and information asymmetries. 
National monies also constitute a barrier to trade. This literature has recently been revived and 
has been used to measure the effect of a monetary union on international trade.  
 
  Several recent studies have improved our knowledge of the effects of a monetary 
unification (union) on trade. First, Engel and Rogers (1995) found that crossing the border 
between the US and Canada has an impact on relative price volatility, equivalent to an 
addition of, at least, 1780 miles, to the distance between cities.  Second, McCallum (1995) 
and Helliwell (1998) conclude that Canadian provinces are 12 to 20 times more likely to trade 
with each other than with US States.  Third a series of studies initiated by Andrew Rose 
(2000) and Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew Rose (1997 and 1998) and using a large international 
panel data sets, find that membership in a currency union leads to a multiplication of trade by 
a factor of three or more: such effects of monetary integration on trade are also known as 
“Rose effects” that is illustrated in Box 2.    
 
 Box 2.  The “Rose effect” behind the endogeneity of economic integration 
Several authors have inquired whether the mere creation of a currency union leads to an 
increase in trade, over and above the positive impact generated by the elimination of nominal 
exchange rate volatility (see, amongst others, Rose (2000), Skudelny (2003), Baldwin, Skudelny 
and Taglioni (2004), and references therein).   
The link between trade deepening and exchange rate volatility has been discussed at 
length by the literature. Most studies employing time series techniques find no significant 
relationship between the two, or at most some very small negative effect of volatility on trade (see 
Baldwin, Skudelny and Taglioni (2004) for a survey).  Cross-sectional studies find relatively small 
effects, while more recent studies based on panel data analysis find some significant and negative 
effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade: in the long run the impact could be quite large and 
even in the order of 10 percent (see Rose (1999), De Grauwe and Skudelny (2001) and Anderson 
and Skudelny (2001)).   
Baldwin, Skudelny and Taglioni (2004) theorize that a drop in exchange rate volatility 
may increase the volume of trade in two not mutually exclusive ways:  
•  first by encouraging more export per firm, and  
•  second by increasing the number of firms that are engaged in exporting.   
However, of these two effects the second must be dominating as given the magnitude of the 
impact of monetary union on trade found by most empirical studies and the small size of 
transaction costs (conversions of currencies and hedging of exchange rate) that are eliminated by a 
currency union.  Hence, a crucial element is the decision of firms to enter foreign markets as 
postulated by the “beachhead model” of Baldwin (1988) that is empirically supported by Tybout 
and Roberts (1997).  
 
In order to conceptualise the “Rose Effect” Baldwin, Skudelny and Taglioni (2004) start 
by observing that Europe has a high share of small firms that either do not export, or export very 
little. One factor that keeps them from exporting is the uncertainty involved in trade: therefore, a 
reduction in uncertainty can induce more firms to export, raising trade volumes. While this 
accounts for a negative volatility-trade link -- see straight dotted line in Figure 4 -- it still does not 
address the “Rose effect,” namely the impact of currency union controlling for a linear (or log-
linear) volatility-trade link. To get this, we must also explain why the volatility-trade link is 
convex. Figure 4 helps illustrating this argument.   
 
Suppose the true relationship between volatility and trade is convex, as illustrated by the solid 
curve in the diagram. An empirical model that assumed a linear link between volatility and trade 
(again, the straight dotted line), but also allowed a dummy for monetary union (implying zero 
exchange rate volatility), would estimate the dummy to be positive and significant. There may be 
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initial set of exporting firms includes more small firms, the marginal impact of lower 
volatility could be large; and  
•  second, the distribution of European firms is heavily skewed towards smaller firms. “Thus 
each reduction in the minimum size-class necessary for exporting brings forth an ever larger 
























b.  A survey of “endogeneity of OCA” international studies 
  
  A large number of studies ensued and an extensive survey, as well as, a “meta-
analysis” is in Rose (2004). Skudelny (2003) proposes the summary of the effects of a 
currency union on trade creation. Using the findings of each study, in the last two columns of 
Table 1, she calculates a confidence interval of 5% around the currency union coefficient. For 
Rose (2000) that uses no EMU-data at all, she finds that the effect lies between 150 and 340 
percent, for Rose and Engel (2001) between 60 and 590 percent – for the model including all 
regressors– and for Glick and Rose (2001) between 90 and 130 percent for the fixed effects 
estimation. 
Table 1. The Effects of a Common Currency (Dummy) on Trade 




Effect on trade given 5% 
conf. interval of 
coefficient 
          
Minimum Maximum 
Rose  (2000)   1.21  0.14  3.35 2.55  4.41 
Rose-van 
Wincoop 
(2001)   0.91  0.18  2.48 1.75  3.54 
Persson  (2001)   0.51  0.26  1.67 1.00  2.77 
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April 2005Honohan  (2001)   0.92  0.4  2.51 1.15  5.50 
Pakko and Wall  (2001)   -0.38  0.53  0.68 0.24  1.93 















Tenreyro  (2001)   0.47  0.32  1.60 0.85  3.00 















Engel-Rose  (2001)   1.21  0.37  3.35 1.62  6.93 
Frankel-Rose  (2002)   1.36  0.18  3.90 2.74  5.54 
Glick-Rose  (2002)   0.65  0.05  1.92 1.74  2.11 
Nitsch  (2002b)   0.82  0.27  2.27 1.34  3.85 
Walsh and Thom  (2002)   0.1  0.2  1.11 0.75  1.64 
Nitsch  (2002a)   0.62  0.17  1.86 1.33  2.59 
















Nitsch 2/  (2002) 
High 0.93-1.25 0.23-0.39  2.53-3.49 1.18-2.10 4.22-6.08 
  
Low 0.18-0.63 0.25-0.45  1.20-1.88 0.51-1.15 2.31-3.22 
1/
 If the effect is X, the country participating in a currency union would trade X times (or X - 1 times 
more than) what a country outside a currency union would trade. 
2/ Nitsch presents a range of estimates. The highest (shown) include a corrected Rose (2000) data set, 
with ranges for the different yearly estimations.  The lowest (shown) allow for the introduction of 
different currency dummies, with ranges for the different yearly estimations.  
Source: Rose (2002b), Nitsch (2002), and Skudelny (2003) 
 
Although these results were received with some scepticism, the trade creation effects 
from monetary unification proved to be quite robust qualitatively.  There are however some 
qualifications.
4 Recent research by Melitz (2001) and Persson (2001) argues for lower 
estimates. The minimum point estimate (from Persson) still suggests a 13 per cent increase in 
trade from currency unification with a preferred estimate of around 40 per cent.  Skudelny 
(2003) asks whether the mere creation of a currency union leads to an increase in trade, over 
and above the positive impact generated by the elimination of nominal exchange rate 
volatility. She finds that, with the exception of Rose (2000), no other study includes a 
volatility variable in addition to the currency union dummy. Therefore, the effects that are 
attributed to currency unions might also reflect the effects of the disappearance of nominal 
exchange rate volatility.  
 
c.   European evidence (1): the effects of the euro on euro area trade  
 
The above proposition of a trade creation effects from monetary unification can only 
now begin to be tested for the euro area using a few years of data. Rose and Van Wincoop 
(2001) use an estimated version of the theoretical model of Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2001) to infer the impact from EMU on intra Euro Area trade and welfare. They conclude 
                                                 
4 For example, Quah (1999) notes that this empirical evidence pertains to a narrow set of relatively 
small (or even tiny) countries/territories representing about 1% of the sample used by Frankel and Rose 
(2002) and Rose (2000).  Such entities have at times adopted the currency of a much larger partner 
country: often the US or some other former coloniser, or a large neighbour, or an important trading or 
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of magnitude is also postulated by Bun and Klaassen (2002) who use a dynamic panel model 
finding a cumulated long-run effect of about 40 percent.  Bun and Klaassen (2002) using a 
dynamic panel model also find that the euro has already increased trade by 4 percent in the 
first year. It is also clear from these recent studies that the large trade-boosting effect of 
monetary unions uncovered by Rose will take a long time to be fully realized.  
Anderton and Skudelny (2001) estimate an import demand function for the euro area 
vis-à-vis its main extra-area trading partners which takes into account the possible impact of 
both intra- and extra-euro area exchange rate uncertainty. Using some panel estimates they 
find that extra-euro area exchange rate volatility may have reduced extra-euro area imports by 
around 10 per cent resulting in some substitution between extra- and intra-euro area imports.   
 
Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003) employ a modified version of the gravity model 
using panel data and country-pair fixed effects.  Their finding is that, the impact of shared 
adoption of the euro (i.e., membership in EMU) ranges from 4 to 10 percent, and from 8 to 16 
percent when compared to trade between countries that have not adopted the euro. In 
addition, there is no evidence of trade diversion. 
 
Baldwin, Skudelny and Taglioni (2004) present an analysis based on sectoral data 
(chemicals and related products, manufactured goods classified by material, machinery and 
transport equipment, and miscellaneous manufactured articles).  They find that the creation of 
EMU would increase trade by 70-112 percent according to regressions pooled by countries 
and industries, and by 21 to 108 percent according to sector-by-sector panels. Third countries 
tend to trade up to 27 percent more with euro area countries since the launch of the euro.    
 
European evidence (2): the effects of the euro on euro area prices  
Figure 5 illustrates the significant convergence of HICP inflation in Stages I, II and 
III and particularly in the run up to EMU.  Figure 6 illustrates a significant decline in inflation 
dispersion in the euro area.  In particular the unweighted standard deviation fell from around 
6 percentage points (p.p.) during the 1980s 1 p.p. since the beginning of Stage 3. This figure, 
however, also shows that the low inflation dispersion was achieved prior to the start of EMU.  
 
The inflation dispersion observed in the euro area is very similar to that of the 14 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the US (using either monthly or bimonthly data). 
However, the degree of inflation dispersion within the euro area is still double the comparable 
measures computed across the German Länders, the Spanish Autonomous Communities and 
the Italian cities since 1997.  
 
Beck and Weber (2001) focus on the volatility of relative price changes across 
locations. The authors draw on Engel and Rogers (1996) and apply a similar methodology to 
a European data set. Their data are monthly covering the period from January 1991 to June 
2000. The data cover the aggregate CPI, 7 categories of goods and 81 locations in five 
different countries: Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Four Swiss locations are 
used as controls. Comparing the periods pre- and post- EMU: there has been a significant 
decline in the cross border volatility of relative prices. This pattern is particularly noticeable 
for regions in Italy, Spain and Portugal relative to regions in Germany. Border effects for 
these pairs have been reduced to 20% of pre-EMU levels  
 
Anderton, Baldwin and Taglioni (2002)) observe that while most intra-European 
bilateral exchange rates were fairly volatile in the 1980s and 1990s, one group of countries -- 
the “Deutsche Marc bloc” consisting of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Denmark -- consistently maintained very narrow margins of exchange rate volatility. They 
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d. Germany’s trade with other EU nations (exhibiting higher exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis 
the DM, such as Italy, Spain and France). Their finding is that in an environment 
characterised by lower volatility the pass-through of price changes was higher. The 
implication of this “natural experiment” from Europe, according to the authors, is that 
monetary union could produce changes in corporate strategies: i.e., in EMU segmentation 
strategies would become less advantageous and firms would be less able to maintain large 
price gaps across countries. This would result in faster cross-boarder transmission of price 
movements which, in turn, would tend to homogenise price movements across member 
countries of a monetary union.  
 






















Figure 6.  The dispersion of annual inflation across euro area countries and the 
US 14 Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(unweighted standard deviation in percentages)
Sources: Eurostat and US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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assembled by The Economist Intelligence Units that has collected prices on a variety of 
comparable goods and services across over 100 cities worldwide during 1990 and 2003.   
Looking at euro area countries, they find a decline in price dispersion over much of the 1990s 
(that is likely to be linked with the Single Market Programme) but no evidence of a tendency 
for prices to converge after January 1999: i.e., after the introduction of the euro.  This 
seeming lack of progress of the law of one price since January 1999 needs to be better 
understood.  Engel and Rogers explain that it may partly be explained by the drive toward the 
Single Market Programme early in the sample period, and by the anticipation of the euro prior 
to its launch.   
 
Some summary observations on the endogeneity of economic integration  
 
In summary, the theory and the international empirical evidence of the trade creating 
effects of a monetary union is now well-established.  The international empirical studies of 
the “endogeneity of OCA” suggests that the potential for deeper economic integration after 
monetary unification is large: trade could grow by several multiples upon monetary 
integration. Such gains would apply even to closely linked countries such as Canada and the 
US.    
 
The early evidence for euro area countries is encouraging but still very dispersed: the 
launch of the euro may contribute to raising reciprocal trade among euro area countries 
between a few percentage points to over 100 percent.  At the same time, the evidence of such 
an effect in the euro area is still rather limited.  More studies are now being produced as more 
data are becoming available.   
 
There are two important qualifications to keep in mind in order to set these findings 
into context. The first qualification is that in any case European countries exhibit already high 
degrees of openness: trade among European countries has continuously risen since the onset 
of European institutional integration that started in 1958 with the launch of a free trade area, 
followed by a custom union in 1968, and a common market in 1993 (see Dorrucci, Firpo, 
Fratzscher, and Mongelli (2004), and Mongelli, Dorrucci and Agur (2004)). Hence, at this 
point it may be difficult to witness spectacular surges in intra-European trade of several 
magnitudes.  The second qualification is that, the trade creating effects of a monetary union 
may take a lot of time to be felt (a point also risen by Rose (2004)). Rose suggests a period of 
about 15-20 years).  
   
Section 4.  Endogeneity of financial integration (i.e., insurance schemes) 
 
  Defining financial integration is a broad and complex task as it embraces an 
assortment of financial instruments, a wide array of financial intermediaries, and a variety of 
financial market segments.  Following Ferrando et alii (2004) we postulate that financial 
integration is achieved when all potential market participants with the same relevant 
characteristics: (1) face a single set of rules when they decide to deal with those financial 
instruments and/or services; (2) have equal access to the above-mentioned set of financial 
instruments and/or services; and (3) are treated equally when they are active in the market.  
a.   Effects of financial integration 
 
Financial integration generates several widely accepted benefits such as the improved 
allocation of capital, higher efficiency, and higher economic growth. Amongst others, 
financial markets can provide a significant source of insurance against asymmetric shocks. 
Graphically, financial integration has the effect of endogenously shifting the OCA lines in 
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e. monetary unification enhances financial integration, it will endogenously improve insurance 
against asymmetric shocks, thereby reducing the costs of a monetary union: an important 
endogenous component for EMU.  
 
One interesting line of research has lead to the identification of a “border effect” also for 
financial market integration.  Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993), Bayoumi and Klein (1997) and 
Crucini (1999) all find that risk sharing across the regions of a country is significantly larger 
than across countries.  Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996) looked at channels of interstate 
risk sharing in the US. They focused on shocks to gross state product and found that: 39% of 
the shocks were smoothed through capital markets, 23% are smoothed through credit markets 
and 13% through the federal government. 25% are not smoothed.  Hence, financial markets 
and institutions in the US contribute with 62% (i.e., 39% + 23%) to the absorption of state 
idiosyncratic shocks. The effect is about five times more important than the federal budget.
5   
A similar analysis using the same methodology by Marinheiro(2003) finds considerably 
lower smoothing through the capital markets across within the Eurozone. In the latter most of 
the smoothing occurs through the national governments budget and has an intertemporal 
character, instead of an interregional one. Melitz (2004) reconsiders the approach of Asdrubali 
et alii and obtains a lower smoothing through capital markets and casts doubts over the measured 
risk sharing via credit markets. Household savings play a more important role and the uninsured 
share of shocks is larger.   
 
b.   European evidence (1): the effects of the euro on financial prices, interest rates and 
equity returns  
 
Money markets integrated almost immediately after the introduction of the euro. The 
transition was smooth and swift. However, even in money markets, integration has not 
progressed in a uniform way in the different market segments. The unsecured deposit market 
may be regarded as fully integrated. The repo segment, where market participants exchange 
short run liquidity against collateral is less well integrated (see Berg, Grande and Mongelli 
(2004) and ECB, July 2001 “The Euro area Money Market Report”).   
 
Looking at bond markets it is clear that the integration of financial markets in the 
euro area started well before Stage 3 of Economic and Monetary Union. Yield differentials 
among euro area government bonds converged markedly since 1996. This convergence 
accelerated further after the pre-announcement of the irrevocable fixing of parities in May 
1998. Since May 1998 yield differentials have only rarely exceeded 40-50 basis points while 
in early nineties spreads of more than 500 basis points – mostly reflecting inflation 
differentials – were not uncommon.  There are diverse explanations for this phenomenon: 
institutional investors have, to some extent, seized the opportunities opened by the 
disappearance of relevant currency matching restrictions.  However, Adjaoute, Danthine and 
Isakov (2003) discern no obvious pattern in the dispersion of ex-post real yields pre- and 
post-EMU.  But still there is a considerable decrease in volatility of real yields.   
 
Adjaoute, Danthine and Isakov (2003) find some new  evidence that the equity risk 
premium may have decreased in Europe reducing the cost of capital. There is also evidence 
that the structure of equity returns has changed in Europe: country factors now appear to be 
dominated by the factors associated with industries or sectors.  They conclude, however, that 
there is little evidence in support of the hypothesis that the average European investor is now 
more financially diversified than in the recent past. Rather European financial markets 
continue to be seriously undiversified.  See Galati and Tsetsaronis (2001) BIS.   
                                                   
5 Another limitation of this comparison is that the European Union is not currently endowed with a 
“federal budget” i.e., a supranational shock-absorbing scheme.  The bulk of the EU budget consists of 
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and the degree of interest rate pass-through using post-1999 data. Banks are in fact likely to 
rapidly internalise the changes stemming from EMU. They show that the pass-through of 
changes in money market rates is not only faster and more complete but also increasingly 
homogenous across the euro area. Bank retail rate spreads have also fallen steadily. 
  
c.   European evidence (2): the financial effects of the euro 
 
Much attention has been attracted by the substantial increase in direct and portfolio 
investment flows between the euro area and abroad since the end of the 1990s. However, 
there has also been a less well documented increase in direct and portfolio investment flows 
within the euro area.  
 
Figure 7 shows both the intra and extra-euro area total foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and equity capital flows.  Over the sample period intra-euro area and extra-euro area 
FDI showed comparable patterns, posting a remarkable increase in 2000 and 2001. It is 
noteworthy that the annual percentage change of intra-euro area FDI, has been higher than the 
extra-euro area FDIs during 2000-1.  There are important caveats and qualifications of these 
data.  The most important one is that it is as yet unclear how much of this observed increase 
in FDI is due to the conditions of economic boom during 1999-2001.   
 




















Total direct investment-intra Of which Equity capital -intra Total direct investment-extra Of which Equity capital -extra  
 
Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) transaction show a similar development as the intra 
and extra-euro area FDI. M&A investments increased markedly between 1996 and 2000 
posting a seven-fold increase (Figure 8).  However, here also a qualification should be made. 
The large increase in M&A activity observed during 1997-2001 is probably linked to the asset 
bubbles and the economic boom. We observe a sharp fall since 2001. It is therefore unclear 
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Extra-euro area Intra-euro area  
 
There has also been an increase in bond issuance both by non-financial corporations 
and by monetary and financial institutions (MFIs) – see Ferrando et alii (2004). The increased 
access of non-financial corporations to market finance reflects, in part, stronger competition 
within the European financial sector. Banks are therefore under pressure to use their balance 
sheet more efficiently in order to increase their return on equity. As a consequence banks are 
increasingly facilitating the access by corporations to capital markets. A particular significant 
development, in this context, is the very fast growth of issuances by smaller and less well 
established firms. 
 
A look at the assets side of the balance sheet of the MFIs in the euro area -- and more 
specifically at the loans of the MFIs -- provides some indications of progress in integration in 
financial services. Loans represent in fact the most important asset in the balance sheet of the 
MFIs.  Figure 9, which collects also the gross stock of the loans to euro area residents versus 
non-euro area residents, shows a remarkable increase of intra- euro area loans, compared to 
the extra-euro area loans, after the 1998. However, after the year 2000 a sharp decline occurs 
again, leaving this ratio at a somewhat higher level than at the start of the eurozone.  
 
 
Adam, Jappelli, Menichini, Padula and Pagano (2002) find that the share of funds 
managed with a Europe-wide investment strategy increases for money market and bond 
market funds. Both types of funds show a significant progress during the first months of 1999 
for almost every country.  Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001) observe a significant acceleration in 
German investor purchases of euro-area securities, ahead of EMU in 1998, with an 
intensification in 1999 and 2000.  
 
Similarly, the share of euro area bonds in the overall bond portfolio of Italian neutral 
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d.  Some summary observations on the endogeneity of financial integration  
 
In summary, from the partial evidence reported here, one can deduce that some 
progress has been made towards more financial integrations in the euro area. There is no 
doubt that this progress, especially in the money and bond markets has been due to the 
introduction of the euro. Yet, the euro area is still far from a unified financial market. The 
view of Giovannini (2002) according to which European financial markets are still a 
juxtaposition of national markets may not be far off the mark. But over time financial market 
integration in the EU/euro area might lead to stronger international risk sharing.  
 
 
Section 5.  Endogeneity of symmetry of shocks.  
a.  Effects of economic and financial integration on income correlation 
Several authors note that the process of economic integration affects the symmetry of 
output fluctuations through diverse channels (see Figure 10).  According to Frankel and Rose 
(1998) the removal of trade barriers raises trade, allows demand shocks to more easily spread 
across the trading partners, and leads to more correlated business cycles.  They also mention 
that policy shocks will become more correlated.  Coe and Helpmann (1995) argue that 
knowledge and technology spillovers will also increase with economic integration and 
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Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, Yosha (2003) argue instead that higher financial 
integration may lead to more asymmetric macroeconomic fluctuations, possibly 
counterbalancing the other channels.  The argument runs as follows. Economic integration 
leads to better risk-sharing opportunities (income insurance) through financial market 
integration. This in turn makes specialisation in production more attractive, rendering 
macroeconomic fluctuations less symmetric.  
 
The implications for EMU of the work of all these channels could be substantial.  We 
illustrate these with the following two distinct (illustrative) paradigms -- specialisation versus 




   The specialisation paradigm postulates that as countries become more integrated, 
they become increasingly specialized. The dynamics underlying this process is based on 
become less diversified and more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. Correspondingly their 
incomes will become less correlated.
 Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (2003) provide 
empirical evidence that financial integration enhances specialisation in production. The 
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b.   The specialisation paradigm 
economies of scale and agglomeration effects. Members of a currency union would then consequence is that an increase in integration could move a group of countries that are in the 
OCA-zone outside this zone, e.g., from point 1 in Figure 11 to point 2. Whether it does this 
depends on the relative strength of two opposing forces that result from increased integration: 
the increase in asymmetry which increases the costs of the union and the increase in the 
efficiency gains of the monetary union. 
 






















The second paradigm is the “endogeneity of OCA” hypothesis that postulates a 
positive link between income correlation and trade integration. The basic intuition behind this 
hypothesis is that a common currency as “a serious and durable commitment” (McCallum 
(1995)).  It precludes future competitive devaluations, facilitates foreign direct investment and 
the building of long-term relationships, and may over time encourage forms of political 
integration. This will promote reciprocal trade, economic and financial integration and it will 
foster business cycle synchronisation among the countries sharing a single currency. This idea 





































Figure 12.   A Country Joins the EU and then EMU and 
the  “Endogeneity” of OCA Dominates 
                        Economic integration 
        Symmetry 
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c.   The “endogeneity of OCA” paradigm The group is initially on the left of the OCA line.  If these countries join together and 
form a “union,” such as the European Union (EU), both trade integration and income 
correlation within the group will rise: i.e., they will gradually move to point 2. If the same 
countries were to start a currency area -- e.g., EMU -- the degree of trade integration and 
income correlation within this group would rise even further and the group would 
subsequently find itself on the right of the OCA line.  
 
 
Frankel and Rose (1996) have undertaken important empirical research relating to this 
issue. They analysed the degree to which economic activity between pairs of countries is 
correlated as a function of the intensity of their trade links. Their conclusion was that a closer 
trade linkage between two countries is strongly and consistently associated with more tightly 
correlated economic activity between the two countries. This is also confirmed in the studies of 
Rose and Engel(2001) and Rose(2002). Similar evidence is presented in Artis and Zhang 
(1995), who find that as the European countries have become more integrated during the 1980s 
and 1990s, the business cycles of these countries have become more correlated.  
 
Firdmuc (2004) makes a case that intra-industry trade (the type of trade that has risen 
the most among euro area countries thus far), raises symmetry of business cycles (while inter-
industry trade would do the opposite).  Melitz (2004) explains why EMU would promote intra-
industry trade, reduce national specialization, and increase the symmetry of business cycles as 
follows.  As income rises, the additional trade is likely to concern goods that are more income 
elastic and price-elastic in demand. This entails more trade in differentiated products and 
increasing intra-industry trade.  Industry shocks would become increasingly common shocks 
and spread more rapidly.  
 
There is another piece of empirical evidence that enhances the view that economic 
integration may not lead to increased asymmetric shocks within a union. This has to do with 
the rising importance of services. Economies of scale do not seem to matter as much for 
services as for industrial activities. As a result, economic integration does not lead to regional 
concentration of services in the way it does with industries. As services become increasingly 
important (today they account for 70% or more of GDP in many EU-countries) the trend 
towards regional concentration of economic activities may stop even if economic integration 
moves forward. There is some evidence that this is already occurring in the USA. In a recent 
study, the OECD (2000) came to the conclusion that the regional concentration of economic 
activities in the USA started to decline after decades of increasing concentration. 
 
In summary, there seems to be some evidence indicating that in the past increased 
integration leads to more symmetry in economic shocks. Whether this will continue to be so 
in the future remains uncertain. Economies of scale and agglomeration effects may do their 
work in enhancing  asymmetries. In addition, it is difficult at this stage to gauge the effect of 
financial integration on specialisation. Nevertheless we are inclined to conclude that the 
endogeneity of the OCA-paradigm will tend to prevail.  
 
Section 6.  Endogeneity of product and labour market flexibility  
 
  In this section we identify, and graphically illustrate, the conditions under which a 
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d.   The empirical evidence thus far for specialization or endogeneity of OCA 
e.  Some summary observations on the endogeneity of symmetry of shocks  still very preliminary and more time may be required for more clearly discern the effects of 
the euro.     
 
a.  Some “early” evidence: the effects of the euro on wages 
  
A visible phenomenon of recent years has been the stabilisation in the run-up to EMU 
and since the launch of the euro. A large part of this stabilisation of nominal wages is 
concurrent with the decline in inflation observed during the same period. Calmfors (2001) and 
Pichelmann (2003) note that this wage moderation had coincided with a reappearance of 
national income policies, a strengthening of national wage co-ordination in some countries, 
and longer contract periods in some others (as a result also of lower negotiation costs and a 
higher predictability of real wages).  The following Figure 13 shows that wage rate inflation 
has declined across the euro area and so has wage dispersion.  It is reassuring that other 
indicators, such as unit labour costs and compensation per employees (not shown here), 
provide a similar picture. 
 
The increased use of national wage policies might be linked to the monetary 
discipline imposed by a common currency. There are other areas in which the common 
currency affects the wage bargaining process. In particular, monetary unification, may affect 
wage bargaining more generally by enhancing price transparency and fostering competition in 
product and service markets. This reduces the potential rent to be shared by workers and firms 
and encourages a de-centralisation of wage bargaining.   
 
In this connection, Calmfors (2001) remarks that the current resurgence of national 
bargaining co-ordination through national income policies, social pacts, and consensual 
norms may represent a transitional phase that might be exhausted over the next 10-15 years. 
There is instead a long run shift towards decentralised bargaining. The macroeconomic 
implications of such a change could be very significant.   
 
b.  Looking at labour market reforms and policies 
 
  Is EMU encouraging or hindering labour market reforms?   As so often in economics 
there are strikingly opposing views on this issue. One view is pessimistic and argues that a 
monetary union weakens the incentives to introduce structural reforms. This view is 
exemplified by Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2002). These authors note that the loss of monetary 
policy discretion at the country level lowers the incentive to undertake large-scale reform of 
labour markets as it precludes a “two-handed” approach according to which macroeconomic 
stimulus should facilitate structural reforms.  They conclude, however, that EMU increases 
the likelihood of having gradual reforms and co-ordination of reform across countries. 
 
Other representatives of this pessimistic school of thought are Sibert and 
Sutherland(2000), Soskice and Iversen (2001) and  Cukiermann and Lippi (2001)). These 
authors  are concerned that with EMU the “deterrence argument” might be weakened, or at 
least diluted, so that  incentives for real wage restraints could be diminished. 
 
  A second more optimistic view is to be found in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) 
according to these authors, product market deregulation and enhanced competition decrease 
total rents to be shared, the incentives for workers to appropriate such rents would then 
decrease making labour unions weaker, reducing insider power and leading to labour market 
deregulation. In this connection, Jean and Nicoletti (2002) find a significant relationship 
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c. Empirical evidence on an EMU-effect of labour market reforms 
 
  Which labour market reforms do we actually see? Bertola and Boeri (2003) conduct an 
insightful experiment: they take stock of reforms carried out in Europe in the field of 
employment protection and non-employment benefits.  In a first step they look at the broad 
orientation of reforms: in the case of employment protection whether they are becoming more 
or less stringent, and in the case on non-employment benefits whether their “reward” would 
increase or decrease. Non-employment benefits include a variety of rewards: the most 
important are unemployment benefits, but various other cash transfers are also included, as 
well as pensions and some forms of employment protection.   
 
  The second step in their exercise is articulated in two distinct stages. In a first stage 
they classify reforms as marginal or radical depending on whether the reforms are 
comprehensive, involve existing entitlements and reduce replacement rates of the average 
production worker by 10 percent or more.  The second stage is a validation procedure to 
verify the actual behaviour of the series. This requires collecting a number of successive 
observations to confirm the initial qualitative assessment (and exclude that a reform has been 
reverted).  An important working assumption by the authors is that they choose a relatively 
early EMU break, i.e., 1995, presuming that the convergence process led by the Maastricht 
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through 2002 for euro area and non-euro area EU countries. The impact of EMU on reforms 
is visible since mid-1990s and particularly for reforms of non-employment benefits.  The data 
indicate an acceleration of reforms especially in the euro area and in the field of non-
employment benefits. Bertola and Boeri caution against any over-interpretation of these 
results as it will take more time to understand the joint effect of many reforms (several of 
which are marginal or are offset or compensated by measures to compensate specific interest 
groups).  
 
  A very different approach is pursued by Morgan and Mourougane (2003) who 
show an increasing relevance of Active Labour Market Measures across all European 
countries during 1985 and 2000.   In percentage of GDP, such measures grew to about 1 % in 
1999 and 2000.  
 
d.  Some summary observations on the endogeneity of labour market flexibility  
 
In summary, there has been significant progress towards wage moderation and discipline. 
This progress, however, was made prior to the start of EMU, and has been maintained since. 
It is not inconceivable that the wage moderation occurring prior to 1999 was influenced by 
the expected start of EMU and the discipline imposed by the Maastricht convergence 
requirements.  
 
  More importantly, several empirical studies have uncovered an endogenous component 
in labour market flexibility. Despite the fact that the theory is unable to predict whether a 
monetary union gives incentives to introduce labour market reforms, the preliminary 




Section 7.  Some preliminary conclusion  
 
This paper brought together several strands of the literature on the endogenous effects 
of monetary integration. A conceptual framework within which to discuss “endogeneities of 
OCA” was presented. The focus was on four areas:  the endogeneity of economic integration, 
the endogeneity of symmetry of shocks, the endogeneity of product and labour market 
flexibility, and the endogeneity of financial integration and the insurance provided by capital 
markets.   We then surveyed the empirical literature to find out how strong these 
endogeneities are likely to be. In all the four areas our conclusion is a measured one. Since 
much of the empirical work is preliminary these conclusions are also. 
 
First, as far as the endogeneity of economic integration is concerned (where we 
looked primarily at trade and prices), we found that EMU has already had a significant effect 
on price changes in product markets: they have become more homogeneous across euro area 
countries. It is unclear, however, how much of this convergence comes from EMU and how 
much from the internal market program. Concerning trade, countless international studies 
suggests that the potential for more trade after monetary unification is large: a monetary union 
is a strong force towards additional trade creation among its members. Such gains would 
apply even to closely linked countries such as Canada and the US.   
 
The launch of the euro may have already contributed to raising reciprocal trade 
among euro area countries. However, these estimates are still very dispersed and limited (due 
to the few data points that are available). There are two important qualifications to keep in 
mind in order to set these findings into context. The first is that in any case European 
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institutional integration that started in 1958.  Hence, it may be difficult to witness spectacular 
surges in intra-European trade of several orders of magnitudes.  The second qualification is 
that, the trade creating effects of a monetary union may take a lot of time to be felt (a point 
also risen by Rose (2004)). Rose suggests a period of about 15-20 years).  
 
Second, the impact of the euro on financial markets is evident in some market 
segments such as money markets. In other segments, the introduction of the euro may be 
starting to contribute to greater depth and liquidity.  In bond and equity markets a gradual 
process of structural change and increasing integration is unfolding.  Evidence of significant 
risk-sharing is modest thus far, but encouraging. However, there are several areas in which 
financial market integration has not yet had significant effects.   
 
Third, our discussion leads to the expectation that we should await more symmetry in 
shocks for euro area countries. Although there is still a lot of uncertainty here on how 
clustering forces will display their effects vis-à-vis dispersion forces, and to what extent 
increased risk sharing (i.e., financial integration) will foster income insurance and 
specialisation, it is not unreasonable to observe that there is an endogeneity effect in the 
degree of symmetry of shocks in EMU. 
 
Fourth, although the theory is ambiguous, some empirical studies have come to the 
conclusion that labour market flexibility is likely to be enhanced in a monetary union. If this 
is confirmed by more studies, it leads to the conclusion that the start of a monetary union 
creates a potentially powerful endogeneity for these OCA-criteria.  
 
On the whole our conclusion is one of moderate optimism. The different 
endogeneities that exist in the dynamics towards optimal currency areas are at work. How 
strong these endogeneities are and how quickly they do their work remains to be seen.  Some 
non-economic factors may be playing a role as well.  In fact, some authors are asking 
whether it matters why a currency union is created in the first place. Would 
alternative motivations for the creation of a monetary union affect the endogeneities 
they may engender?  It remains also to be understood how such historical and cultural 
motivations may affect the linkages that have been discussed in the paper.  These 
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